Introduction
There is an increasing consensus that growing emissions of greenhouse gases pose a serious threat to the world. One strategy for addressing this threat is to use environmental policy such as a cap and trade system to constrain emissions; the approach envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol of the Framework Convention on Climate Change that has entered into force and will be implemented in most industrial nations beginning in 2008. The use of a cap and trade system in this agreement was seen as a success of economic reasoning by many, because such systems are widely heralded as generating a given level of abatement in the most "cost-effective" manner. The Bush Administration has taken the United States out of the Kyoto Protocol and instead adopted a technology policy that includes support for R&D as an alternative strategy, with the idea that without technological options to reduce greenhouse gases an emission constraint will mostly punish the economy by slowing economic growth. While such a punishment seems mostly exaggerated for "small" reductions in emissions the ultimate goal of the Framework Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations, requires that the world economy reduces emissions by 90 to 95% from best projections of where it otherwise would be. This is untested territory, and thus the need for new technology is real if these stabilization goals are to be met.
However, even recognizing that new technology is needed, one might believe that appropriate environmental policy instruments-the right emissions constraint or tax-would induce new technologies.
We study the cost effectiveness of these different strategies. If emissions are priced will that induce technical change? Can R&D subsidies achieve emission reductions, and is this strategy cheaper than using emission constraints? Are the two strategies complementary? Can one improve on uniform emission-reduction policy by differentiating policy toward relatively dirty technologies? Previous investigations of the two strategies include Jaffe et al. (2005) and the general equilibrium analyses of Goulder and Schneider (1999) and Popp (2004) , who show that carbon taxes are cost effective when they are complemented by a R&D subsidy. In a costminimization setting, Rosendahl (2004) and Bramoullé and Olson (2005) demonstrate theoretically that technology externalities call for differentiation of pollution taxes. We proceed by empirically studying these different strategies in which we pay specific attention to their differentiation.
For this purpose, we develop a forward-looking computable general equilibrium (CGE) model that captures empirical links between CO 2 emissions associated with energy use, directed technical change and the economy. We draw on endogenous growth models of Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) and Acemoglu (2002) and specify technologies as stocks of knowledge capital that 3 are sector-specific investment goods, which have associated positive externalities. We calibrate the model to the Dutch economy, where availability of investment data for knowledge capital that is consistent with the national accounting framework allows us to pay special attention to its representation in the benchmark data. Simulations are constructed to reveal cost effective combinations of CO 2 constraints and R&D subsidies, including the desirability of differentiating these instruments among clean and dirty sectors.
Basic features of the model
This section describes the key specifications of our model. We offer a full description of the model in Appendix A.
Model specifications
We specify a representative consumer and producers in the following sectors: agriculture (AGR), CO 2 -intensive industry (IND), non-CO 2 intensive industry and services (SER), trade and transport (TT), energy (NRG), CO 2 -intensive electricity (CIE) and non-CO 2 intensive electricity (NCIE), where the energy sector comprises the oil-and gas industries. Agents behave rationally and have perfect foresight. A representative consumer maximizes intertemporal utility subject to the intertemporal budget constraint. Intertemporal utility is a function of the discounted sum of consumption over the time horizon. Environmental quality does not enter the utility function, implying independence of the demand functions for goods with respect to environmental quality.
Producers maximize profits over time subject to their production-possibility frontier, which are determined by nested constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) functions of knowledge capital, physical capital, labor, and intermediate inputs. In addition, imported coal is used in the production of CO 2 -intensive goods and electricity. Intermediate usage of oil, gas, and coal entail CO 2 emissions, which might be subject to quantity constraints, i.e. cap and trade systems.
Technical change is characterized by innovation possibility frontiers, which describe investment in knowledge capital in the sectors. Knowledge capital is sector specific (c.f. Basu and Weil, 1998 learning-by-researching (henceforth referred to as positive feedback). 2 We specify this positive feedback operating within each sector only but relax this assumption in the sensitivity analysis.
Finally, knowledge-capital investments accumulate into stocks, which gives rise to an additional technology externality on sector production. The rationale for this externality is that, while producers can prevent others from using their knowledge capital by means of patent protection, they cannot completely prevent knowledge embodied in patents from spilling over to other producers in their sector. These two types of technology externalities lead to the result that profit maximizing firms underinvest in R&D and thus there exists a rationale to subsidize investments in knowledge capital (henceforth referred to as R&D subsidies).
Regarding international trade, domestically produced goods and physical capital are allocated between domestic and export markets. Goods traded on domestic markets are combined with imported goods into an Armington (1969) 
Equilibrium and growth
Each agent solves its optimization problem. When markets clear at all points in time, the output, price and income paths constitute an equilibrium. Markets for production factors and final goods are perfectly competitive but there initially is no market for CO 2 emissions associated with energy use. The technology externalities support nonconvexities in the possibility frontiers and cause private and social returns to knowledge capital to diverge.
Economic growth reflects the growth rates of the labor supply and stocks of physical and knowledge capital. Growth of the labor supply is exogenous and constant over time. Growth rates of both capital stocks stem from endogenous saving and investment behavior. The economy achieves balanced growth over time with the stocks of physical and knowledge capital growing at the same rate as the labor supply.
Calibration
In this section, we describe the calibration of our model in which we pay special attention to the accounting of knowledge capital. Accounting for knowledge capital in CGE models is relatively new and, when undertaken, is typically done in a rudimentary fashion because of absence of detailed information. Because of the availability of investment data for knowledge capital in The
Netherlands that is consistent with the national accounting framework, we calibrate our model to the Dutch economy. We choose 1999 as the benchmark year.
Accounting for knowledge capital
To account for knowledge capital, we identify and capitalize flows associated with knowledge and subsequently incorporate these in the national accounting matrix (Statistics Netherlands, 2000 
Data and parameter values
Besides accounting for knowledge capital, we make further data adjustments to account for CO 2 emissions associated with energy use. We divide the electricity sector into CO 2 -intensive and non-CO 2 -intensive electricity generation using techno-economic data for the key technologies that are sufficient to give an appropriate representation for both types of electricity generation (Böhringer, et al., 2003) . Table B .1 presents cost structures and market shares of the electricity generation technologies in The Netherlands. Further, we obtain data on fossil-fuel inputs in The
Netherlands from the GTAP-EG database (Paltsev and Rutherford, 2000) and match this data with CO 2 emission data for The Netherlands (Koch, et al., 2002) . We classify CO 2 -intensive industry, trade and transport, energy and CO 2 -intensive electricity as CO 2 -intensive sectors and agriculture, non-CO 2 intensive industry and services and non-CO 2 intensive electricity as non-CO 2 intensive sectors. the elasticity of R&D stocks on total factor productivity at 9 percent for non-G7 OECD countries.
Finally, we consider a 27-year time horizon, defined over the years 1999 through 2025, and calibrate the model to a balanced growth path of two percent, which serves as reference case in the simulations below.
Simulations
We analyze cost-effectiveness of both environmental-and technology policy to reduce cumulative CO 2 emissions in production over the time horizon of the model by 10 percent relative to the reference case, where we differentiate both policies between CO 2 -intensive and non-CO 2 -intensive sectors. Environmental policy takes the form of quantity constraints for CO 2 emissions (i.e. cap and trade systems) and technology policy takes the form of R&D subsidies. To avoid leakage of CO 2 emissions to consumption in all simulations, we also reduce these emissions by 10 percent relative to the reference case using a separate quantity constraint.
Simulation 1: Differentiated CO 2 -emission constraints Figure 1 shows effects of the various possibilities to differentiate the CO 2 emission constraint between CO 2 -intensive and non-CO 2 -intensive sectors on shadow prices of CO 2 emissions in the sectors (lower graph) and discounted utility (upper graph). We explain this figure in several steps, starting with the horizontal axes that list percentage changes in CO 2 emissions of the non-CO 2 -intensive sectors. As a first step, we set these percentage changes exogenously and calculate the CO 2 -emission constraint for the CO 2 -intensive sectors necessary for total emissions in production to be reduced by 10 percent. Second, we use the model to calculate the general equilibrium result associated with each differentiation of both CO 2 emission constraints. The lower graph maps the corresponding sets of shadow prices for CO 2 emissions required to meet the sectoral emission constraints. In general, technology externalities positively affect the shadow prices. In this 8 simulation, however, we find the shadow prices with technology externalities to exhibit negligible differences from those without technology externalities. 5 For this reason, we present only one curve for each sector in this graph. Yet, the technology externalities have a noticeable effect on welfare. As a last step, therefore, we map the changes to discounted utility that correspond with 
Insert Figure 1 here
We find that the conventional result of uniform shadow prices across sectors being cost effective holds if there are no technology externalities. The 10 percent emission reduction in production entails a welfare loss of 0.30 percent over the time period and results in a shadow price of €2.70 per ton CO 2 in all sectors. When there are technology externalities, however, we find that welfare is higher for all differentiations of the CO 2 emission constraints. If the constraints can be set at different levels, we find it cost effective to differentiate the constraints toward the CO 2 -intensive sectors. The 10 percent emission reduction in production now entails a welfare loss of 0.28 percent over the time period and results in shadow prices of €2.80 per ton CO 2 in the CO 2 -intensive sectors and €0.10 per ton CO 2 in the non-CO 2 -intensive sectors. CO 2 emission constraints direct technical change toward non-CO 2 intensive sectors yielding relatively more technology externalities in these sectors and therefore raising their opportunity cost of abatement. The electricity sector, for example, redirects its R&D toward biomass and wind technologies resulting in relatively more knowledge spilling over from the development of these technologies than fossil-fuel electricity technologies. Thus, it is cheaper to shift some abatement toward CO 2 -intensive technologies and sectors.
The bias in technical change can be best understood with help of the general framework presented by Acemoglu (2002) or the framework applied to energy biased technical change of 9 Otto et al. (2005) . On the supply side of the economy, CO 2 -emission constraints give rise to a substitution effect in production in that knowledge capital substitutes for fossil fuels raising the profitability of investing in knowledge capital in the CO 2 -intensive sectors. On the demand side, however, CO 2 -emission constraints give rise to a substitution effect in consumption as consumers shift toward non-CO 2 -intensive goods raising the profitability of investing in knowledge capital in the non-CO 2 -intensive sectors. When introducing CO 2 emission constraints, we find the demand side to be relatively important as substitution in consumption is necessary for cost-effective emission reduction. Technology externalities reinforce the bias.
Simulation 2: Differentiated R&D subsidies
We now study R&D subsidies as our instrument to reduce overall CO 2 emissions in production by 10 percent relative to the reference case. Figure 2 shows effects of the various possibilities to differentiate the CO 2 emission reduction between CO 2 -intensive and non-CO 2 -intensive sectors on required R&D subsidies (lower graph) and discounted utility (upper graph). We obtain 
Insert Figure 2 here
We find that R&D subsidies can also achieve the 10 percent emission reduction in production. In fact, differentiating R&D subsidies toward non-CO 2 intensive sectors not only can reduce emissions but also increases welfare compared to the reference case. Table 1 shows that compared to the hypothetical reference case, however, using R&D subsidies to achieve the emission reduction always entails a welfare loss as R&D subsidies are a first-best instrument to internalize technology externalities but a second-best instrument to reduce emissions.
Insert Table 1 here
The cost-effective set of R&D subsidies yields a welfare gain of 11.3 percent over the time period and comprises an R&D subsidy of 48 percent in the non-CO 2 -intensive sectors and an R&D tax of 50 percent in the CO 2 -intensive sectors. Although the introduction of an R&D subsidy in the non-CO 2 -intensive sectors has a negative effect on CO 2 emissions because of substitution effects in production and consumption, the R&D subsidy also gives rise to a strong rebound effect that offsets the substitution effects. As the R&D subsidy lowers the marginal costs of non-CO 2 -intensive goods, it indirectly increases demand for these goods and the concomitant demand for energy and CO 2 emissions. More importantly, by internalizing some of the technology externalities as well, the R&D subsidy increases welfare leading to an overall higher demand for energy and CO 2 emissions that strengthens the rebound effect. If R&D subsidies are the sole instruments of choice, an R&D tax in CO 2 -intensive sectors is thus preferred in the costeffective solution to keep overall emissions within bounds. 6 Essentially, the policy is one of supporting growth of non-CO 2 intensive sectors while slowing it in CO 2 -intensive sectors.
Introducing R&D subsidies in all sectors is feasible albeit cost ineffective in achieving the emission reduction.
Simulation 3: Combinations of differentiated CO 2 -emission constraints and differentiated R&D subsidies
We next study combinations of CO 2 emission constraints and R&D subsidies as our instruments to abate CO 2 emissions in production by 10 percent relative to the reference case. For this purpose, we augment the first simulation by introducing combinations of differentiated R&D subsidies before computing the general equilibrium associated with each differentiation of the CO 2 emission constraints. This way we can identify both the cost-effective set of differentiated CO 2 emission constraints and the efficient set of differentiated R&D subsidies. Figure 3 shows effects of the various possibilities to differentiate the CO 2 emission constraint between CO 2 -intensive-and non-CO 2 -intensive sectors on shadow prices of CO 2 emissions in the sectors (lower graph) and discounted utility (upper graph) when the efficient set of R&D subsidies is introduced next to the CO 2 -emission constraints.
Insert Figure 3 here
Emission reduction is cost effective if R&D subsidies complement rather than substitute for CO 2 emission constraints. The cost-effective set of instruments yields a welfare gain of 27.1 percent over the time period and comprises R&D subsidies of 62 percent and 53 percent in the CO 2 -intensive and non-CO 2 -intensive sectors as well as shadow prices of €18.60 and €9.30 per ton CO 2 in the respective sectors. Of course, the emission reduction still comes at a cost when compared to the hypothetical reference case in which we would already correct for the technology 11 externalities (see Table 1 ). Compared with this hypothetical case, welfare falls by 1.25 percent over the time period, which is significantly more than the 0.28 percent welfare loss in the case where we do not yet make such a correction (see the first simulation). The CO 2 emission constraints are more binding when the technology externalities are already corrected and hence they entail a bigger deadweight loss.
Regarding differentiation of the policy instruments, we find that continued differentiation remains a feature of the cost-effective policy in this simulation because of interacting policy effects. The CO 2 emission constraints are principally introduced to reduce emissions but also induce technical change and concomitant technology externalities. Similarly, R&D subsidies correct for the technology externalities but at the same time affect CO 2 emissions. The R&D subsidies are now differentiated toward CO 2 -intensive sectors, as they are in the hypothetical reference case in which we just correct technology externalities without regard for emission reduction, and subsequently direct technical change toward these sectors. CO 2 shadow prices remain differentiated in this simulation as technology externalities, and hence the opportunity costs of abatement, remain higher in non-CO 2 intensive sectors because of their initial size and knowledge intensity. Compared to the first simulation though, the difference in shadow prices narrows while shadow prices increase in magnitude because of the CO 2 -emission constraints being more binding. Table 2 shows that the three simulations have different macro-economic effects besides having different welfare implications. Contracted growth characterizes the first simulation with CO 2 emission constraints. Total output growth is negative relative to the reference case, where CO 2 -intensive sectors decrease their production relatively more as they are subject to the more stringent CO 2 -trading scheme. Exceptions are non-CO 2 intensive industries and services and non-CO 2 intensive electricity, which slightly increase their production. With respect to inputs to production, the factor substitution effect in production increases marginal returns to factors other than energy, where the marginal return to physical capital increases to the extent that investments in physical capital actually increase slightly relative to the reference case. Foreign investment changes accordingly. International trade in goods falls proportionally to domestic trade as we assume trading partners of The Netherlands to introduce similar CO 2 emissions abatement policies. Biased growth characterizes the second simulation with R&D subsidies. By using R&D subsidies in non-CO 2 intensive sectors and R&D taxes in CO 2 -intensive sectors, one speeds up growth in the former while slowing it in the latter. The production structure, for example, shifts markedly from CO 2 -intensive to non-CO 2 -intensive goods. Although increased welfare and limited substitution possibilities in the economy lessen the negative impact for the CO 2 -intensive sectors for the first half of the model horizon, these sectors are hit hard afterwards when more substitution has been taking place and path dependency in technical change is strong. Further, more physical capital is required to expand the non-CO 2 -intensive sectors and as a result investments in physical capital increase. Foreign investments change accordingly. Finally, more goods are now imported and fewer goods exported. Enhanced growth characterizes the third simulation with both CO 2 emission constraints and R&D subsidies. Because of the introduction of R&D subsidies in all sectors, total factor productivity and hence production levels increase throughout the economy relative to the reference case. As a result, demand for production factors increases as is reflected in, among others, increased investment in physical capital. Foreign investments and international trade in goods change accordingly.
Macro-economic effects
Insert Table 2 here Sensitivity analysis Table 3 reports the sensitivity of our results to key parameter values. We use central parameter values in all sensitivity simulations (see Tables A.5-6) except for the parameter subject to analysis. Given the importance of technical change for our findings, we focus on technology parameters, which simultaneously are a good proxy for the knowledge-capital accounting. Effects are reported as index values compared to the regular simulations.
Insert Table 3 here
The general result from Table 5 .4 is that our findings are robust to the range of parameter values considered. The cost-effective set of instruments still includes R&D subsidies as complements to, rather than substitutes for, CO 2 -trading schemes while the cost-effective differentiation remains unchanged (no index value changes sign).
Turning to the specific parameters subject to analysis, lowering the depreciation rate of knowledge capital ( H δ ) by 25 percent has a negative effect on intertemporal utility in all simulations as fewer investments in knowledge capital are required yielding less positive feedback in TC. 7 The overall decrease of technology externalities reduces the relative opportunity 7 At the same time, lower depreciation rates lead to bigger stocks of knowledge capital yielding more knowledge spillovers. This positive welfare effect, however, is outweighed by the negative welfare effect of less positive feedback in technical change.
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cost of CO 2 abatement in the non-CO 2 intensive sectors and hence the cost-effective differentiation of the CO 2 -trading schemes in the first and third simulation. In the second simulation, the gap between R&D subsidies widens as R&D subsidy rates fall relatively more in non-CO 2 intensive sectors. Bigger stocks of knowledge capital enhance total factor productivity and the rebound effect, ceteris paribus. It therefore is cost effective to further differentiate R&D subsidies to keep emissions within bounds. The opposite holds if we increase the depreciation rate of knowledge capital by 25 percent.
Lowering the positive-feedback effect in TC (ξ ) by 25 percent has a negative effect on intertemporal utility in all simulations as fewer technology externalities are enjoyed. The decrease of technology externalities reduces the relative opportunity cost of CO 2 abatement in non-CO 2 intensive sectors and hence the cost-effective differentiation of R&D subsidies in the second simulation and of CO 2 -trading schemes in the third simulation. As R&D subsidies fall relatively more in non-CO 2 intensive sectors in the third simulation, the gap between R&D subsidies widens. The opposite holds if we increase the positive-feedback effect by 25 percent.
Specifying a positive feedback in TC to operate across rather than within sectors has a small negative effect on intertemporal utility, especially in the second simulation, as technology externalities in the non-CO 2 intensive sectors now also benefit CO 2 -intensive sectors requiring a higher R&D tax in the latter to keep emissions within bounds. Consequently, the cost-effective differentiation of R&D subsidies widens in the second simulation. In the first and third simulations, however, the cost-effective differentiation of both policy instruments narrows as positive feedback benefits all sectors while the policy instruments are used for their first-best purpose.
Finally, lowering the substitution elasticity between knowledge capital and other factors in production ( H σ ) by 25 percent has a negative effect on intertemporal utility in especially the second-and third simulations as substitution possibilities to adjust to the CO 2 abatement are limited. Moreover, the limited substitution possibilities translate into lower demands for knowledge capital and therefore fewer technology externalities. Consequently, changes in model results are similar to the analysis in which we changed the height of the positive-feedback effect.
Conclusions
Recent interest has arisen with respect to the role of induced innovation in environmental policy, particularly regarding climate change. The Kyoto Protocol that many industrial countries are pursuing relies on a conventional cap and trade system to constrain emissions. The US has 14 withdrawn and has instead adopted technology policy as an alternative strategy with the intent of directing R&D to reduce CO 2 emissions. The questions we addressed in this paper are: Which strategy is preferred from a welfare perspective or does a combination of both strategies work better? Can one improve on uniform emission-reduction policy by differentiating policy toward CO 2 -intensive sectors?
To answer these questions, we developed a forward-looking computable general equilibrium model that captures empirical links between CO 2 emissions associated with energy use, directed technical change and the economy. Environmental quality does not enter the utility function, implying independence of the demand functions for goods with respect to environmental quality.
We specified technologies as knowledge capital, which are sector-specific investment goods and which empirical research has long found to cause positive technology externalities leading to underinvestment relative to what is socially optimal.
At this point, it is necessary to add some policy reality to the discussion. If policies can be designed to correct for technology externalities the economy can gain substantially. We show this to be the case, such that welfare in the Dutch economy under study can be improved by nearly 30 percent over our 27-year time span. We find that R&D subsidies that are optimally differentiated to achieve a 10 percent reduction in CO 2 emissions improve the economy by about 11 percent relative to the reference case where technology externalities are not yet internalized. This appears to be a double-dividend world where CO 2 emissions are reduced while leaving the economy better off. The difficulty, however, is how to design such technology policy in reality. The unrealized 30 percent welfare gain from the technology externalities is evidence of the difficulty of correcting for them. Our best past efforts, patent protection and government funded R&D, leave us with significant underinvestment. To realize the emission reduction requires that we overcome the known limits of government funding and intellectual property rights protection and then direct technology policy toward non-CO 2 -intensive sectors. Our results suggest that the differential policy to achieve the emission reduction needs to be very strong. Essentially, it means creating disincentives for R&D in CO 2 -intensive sectors causing them to wither away, and creating large subsidies for non-CO 2 -intensive sectors, accelerating their growth. If it is possible to ideally correct for the technology externalities, we find that the preferred policy is to do so in combination with CO 2 emission constraints, i.e. cap and trade systems. These constraints are costly to the economy relative to the case where technology externalities are corrected for without reducing emissions, but a combination is much preferred to R&D subsidies alone or emission constraints alone.
Regardless of the particular instruments chosen, we find that technology externalities call for differentiation of instruments between non-CO 2 -intensive and CO 2 -intensive sectors, such that the latter bear relatively more of the abatement burden. Essentially such differentiation partly corrects for the CO 2 implications of the technology externalities. The welfare gain for differentiated emission constraints is relatively small compared with uniform constraints. The gain is large for the differentiation of R&D subsidies; in fact, uniform R&D subsidies are negative in all sectors, essentially slowing economic growth to achieve the emission reduction with highly negative welfare effects relative to the reference case or the cases involving emission constraints.
Thus, is a true double dividend possible? In principle differentiated R&D subsidies with or without CO 2 emission constraints lead to that result, relative to the reference case. However, if we can design such precise incentives for R&D we might as well compare our situation to a reference case where technology externalities are already corrected without regard to emission reduction.
Compared to the "R&D corrected" reference case, emission constraints entail a larger welfare loss than does the "emission constraints only case" relative to the reference case where technology externalities are not yet corrected. So, the answer depends in part on perspective and in large part on the confidence one has that public policy can effectively direct R&D.
Appendix A. Structure and parameter values of the model
This appendix provides an algebraic summary of the model. We formulate the model as a mixedcomplementarity problem using the Mathematical Programming System for General Equilibrium Analysis (Rutherford, 1999) , which is a subsystem of the General Algebraic Modeling System (Ferris and Munson, 2000) . In this approach, three classes of equilibrium conditions characterize an economic equilibrium: zero-profit conditions for production activities, market clearance conditions for each primary factor and good, and an income definition for the representative consumer. The fundamental unknowns of the system are activity levels, market prices, and the 
A.1. Zero profit conditions
Production of goods:
;
Investments in knowledge capital:
20 Imports of goods:
Exports of goods:
Exports of physical capital:
A.2. Market clearing conditions
Goods: 
A.4. Endowments
Supply of labor: Hall, (1988) and larger values typically found in studies that also exploit cross-sectional data (e.g. Beaudry and Wincoop, 1996) . The substitution elasticity in international trade is lower than usual to reflect introduction of similar CO 2 emission reduction policies by most of the trading partners of The Netherlands. We obtain the substitution elasticities in production from the TaxInc model (Statistics Netherlands, 1990) , except for the substitution elasticity between knowledge capital and remaining inputs, which we obtain from Goulder and Schneider (1999) , and except the substitution elasticity in aggregate electricity production, which is assumed. Note: Capital intensities are respectively services derived from knowledge-and physical capital expressed as percentages of gross sectoral product. CO 2 intensities are CO 2 emissions in Mt. expressed as percentage of gross sectoral product in million euros. We obtain data on knowledge capital from De Haan and Rooijen-Horsten (2004) and data on CO 2 emissions from the GTAP-EG database (Paltsev and Rutherford, 2000) and the Emission Monitor for The Netherlands (Koch, et al., 2002) . Notes: All numbers are indexed to the regular simulation. Results in simulation 1 are robust at the 1 percent precision level. Simulation 1 refers to differentiated CO 2 -emission constraints; simulation 2 to differentiated R&D subsidies; simulation 3 to combinations of differentiated CO 2 -emission constraints and differentiated R&D subsidies. Low and high refer to 25 percent lower and higher parameter values than in the regular simulation and uniform refers to positive feedback in technical change being specified to operate across sectors. U denotes discounted utility, p EM denotes the shadow price of CO 2 emissions and s denotes the R&D subsidies.
Appendix B. Data

Figure 1: Effects of differentiated CO 2 -emission constraints on discounted utility
Notes: CO 2 emissions in the CO 2 -intensive sectors change to the extent that overall CO 2 emissions in production are reduced by 10 percent.
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Figure 2: Effects of differentiated R&D subsidies on discounted utility
R&D subsidy rate (%) discounted utility (% change) 37 
R&D subsidies on discounted utility
